See for example the following, from Wikipedia's Alfreda Bikowsky entry[1]:
> Bikowsky was a senior staff member at the Bin Laden Issue Station in January 2000.[16] She was the direct supervisor of Michael Anne Casey, a CIA staff operations officer who was assigned to track future 9/11 hijacker Khalid al-Mihdhar at an al-Qaeda operatives' meeting in Malaysia in early January 2000.[9] Casey blocked a draft cable written by Doug Miller, an FBI agent detailed to the Bin Laden Issue Station, to the FBI warning that al-Mihdhar had a multiple-entry visa for travel to the U.S.[17][18]: 240 Mark Rossini, another FBI agent first assigned to the Bin Laden Issue Station in 1999,[18]: 233 testified that Casey also verbally ordered him to not share information with FBI headquarters about al-Mihdhar or Nawaf al-Hazmi, who was traveling with al-Mihdhar.[2][19] Rossini further stated that Bikowsky told congressional investigators in 2002 that she hand-delivered al-Mihdhar's visa information to FBI headquarters. This was later proven false by FBI log books.[2] The CIA shared some details about al-Mihdhar with the FBI at that time, but not that he had a valid visa to enter the U.S.[18]: 244–7
This kind of story is inconsistent with the notion of a ban on information sharing between the two TLAs.
Of course, Bikowsky's story, and Ray Nowosielski and John Duffy's documentary Who Is Rich Blee, in which her identity was revealed, may be relevant to the linked article in their own right.
I know that information sharing between FBI and intelligence agencies existed in the late 90's, but the CIA was not directly part of that activity. If you look at my links in the GP post, you will see that Clinton's deputy AG was responsible for creating a "wall" between CIA & FBI. It's easy to look at that as a bad thing with the hindsight of 9/11, but I would rather live in a world with such a wall today vs. what we have now.
How do you square that with 1) two FBI agents "detailed to" the CIA's Bin Laden Issue station ("Alec Station"), 2) "CIA shared some details about al-Mihdhar with the FBI at that time"?
Compartmentalisation (i.e. an information "wall") does not equal a total ban on information sharing, as your comment might imply, it just mandates that there are filters and checks on information channels, rather than unfettered sharing, for obvious and sensible operational reasons.
Perhaps it's worth quoting at length from the source[1] for Wikipedia's statement that "CIA shared some details", which has a section on CIA / FBI information sharing:
> 4. Passing of intelligence information by the CIA to the FBI
> The CIA shares intelligence with the rest of the Intelligence Community through a communication known as a “TD” (“Telegraphic Dissemination”). TDs can be sent to other Intelligence Community agencies, including the FBI, and are available to the Intelligence Community through the Intelink system.
> Another type of intelligence report used by the CIA when conducting business with other agencies is a CIR, or “Central Intelligence Report.” CIRs are used for disseminating information to a specific agency or group of agencies. CIRs to the FBI normally concern something occurring in the United States, involving a U.S. person or an ongoing FBI investigation.
> In addition to formal methods of communicating by the CIA to the FBI, much information can be shared with the FBI informally. CIA and FBI employees who have similar positions and expertise develop relationships and communicate informally while working together on related matters, either by secure telephones or in person. In addition, meetings are sometimes held to discuss a matter or a piece of intelligence that is of value to both agencies. According to the CIA employees we interviewed, when the CIA passed intelligence information or other kinds of information verbally or by another informal mechanism to the FBI, the information exchange normally would be documented through a TD or a CIR. However, they said that not every telephone call or conversation was documented.
> C. FBI detailees to the CIA Counterterrorist Center
> In 1996, the FBI began detailing employees to work in the CIA’s CTC. During the time period relevant to this chapter of the report, five FBI employees were detailed to the CTC’s Usama Bin Laden Unit in four separate positions. Two of the positions were filled by personnel from the FBI’s Washington Field Office, and one position each was filled from the FBI’s New York Field Office and FBI Headquarters.
See for example the following, from Wikipedia's Alfreda Bikowsky entry[1]:
> Bikowsky was a senior staff member at the Bin Laden Issue Station in January 2000.[16] She was the direct supervisor of Michael Anne Casey, a CIA staff operations officer who was assigned to track future 9/11 hijacker Khalid al-Mihdhar at an al-Qaeda operatives' meeting in Malaysia in early January 2000.[9] Casey blocked a draft cable written by Doug Miller, an FBI agent detailed to the Bin Laden Issue Station, to the FBI warning that al-Mihdhar had a multiple-entry visa for travel to the U.S.[17][18]: 240 Mark Rossini, another FBI agent first assigned to the Bin Laden Issue Station in 1999,[18]: 233 testified that Casey also verbally ordered him to not share information with FBI headquarters about al-Mihdhar or Nawaf al-Hazmi, who was traveling with al-Mihdhar.[2][19] Rossini further stated that Bikowsky told congressional investigators in 2002 that she hand-delivered al-Mihdhar's visa information to FBI headquarters. This was later proven false by FBI log books.[2] The CIA shared some details about al-Mihdhar with the FBI at that time, but not that he had a valid visa to enter the U.S.[18]: 244–7
This kind of story is inconsistent with the notion of a ban on information sharing between the two TLAs.
Of course, Bikowsky's story, and Ray Nowosielski and John Duffy's documentary Who Is Rich Blee, in which her identity was revealed, may be relevant to the linked article in their own right.
1: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfreda_Frances_Bikowsky