> It's pretty clear that constitution implies some sort of immunity, and that it is necessary to protect successive presidents from throwing each other in prison.
How so? Please elaborate.
I would point out that there's explicit language in Article I, Section 6 about House and Senate members being immune from prosecution for carrying out their duties:
The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States. They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.
However, there is nothing in Article II regarding a grant of immunity to the President.
I could see an argument that the President should probably be protected from arrest during his term, similar to Congressmen, but there's very clearly no mention of such protection in in the Constitution I can find.
However, that's nothing compared to the broad protections the Roberts court handed him in Trump v. United States: protection from investigation, even after his term expires.
I would recommend reading the briefs, listening to oral arguments, and/or reading the decision of the SC case where this was decided, if you are genuinely curious. There are a lot of well sourced argument for and against. These things are not decided out of nowhere.
This passage just says that they can't arrested while they are actually in the house while it is in session. Reads to me, once they leave they can be arrested in the parking lot.
> That one reads more like "all questions about their activities must be asked in the House and no where else",
Read literally, perhaps, but US courts have interpreted that clause more broadly to give general immunity to legislators for their legislative activities. For example, from Gravel v. US [0]:
> Rather, [Gravel's] insistence is that the Speech or Debate Clause, at the very least, protects him from criminal or civil liability and from questioning elsewhere than in the Senate, with respect to the events occurring at the subcommittee hearing at which the Pentagon Papers were introduced into the public record. To us this claim is incontrovertible.
> The Speech or Debate Clause was designed to assure a co-equal branch of the government wide freedom of speech, debate, and deliberation without intimidation or threats from the Executive Branch. It thus protects Members against prosecutions that directly impinge upon or threaten the legislative process. We have no doubt that Senator Gravel may not be made to answer either in terms of questions or in terms of defending himself from prosecution -- for the events that occurred at the subcommittee meeting.
Or from Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund [1] (citations omitted; there are a lot of them!):
> The question to be resolved is whether the actions of the petitioners fall within the "sphere of legitimate legislative activity." If they do, the petitioners "shall not be questioned in any other Place" about those activities, since the prohibitions of the Speech or Debate Clause are absolute[].
> Without exception, our cases have read the Speech or Debate Clause broadly to effectuate its purposes []. The purpose of the Clause is to insure that the legislative function the Constitution allocates to Congress may be performed independently.
> "The immunities of the Speech or Debate Clause were not written into the Constitution simply for the personal or private benefit of Members of Congress, but to protect the integrity of the legislative process by insuring the independence of individual legislators." []. In our system "the clause serves the additional function of reinforcing the separation of powers so deliberately established by the Founders." [].
> The Clause is a product of the English experience. []. Due to that heritage, our cases make it clear that the "central role" of the Clause is to "prevent intimidation of legislators by the Executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary []," []. That role is not the sole function of the Clause, however, and English history does not totally define the reach of the Clause. Rather, it "must be interpreted in light of the American experience, and in the context of the American constitutional scheme of government...." []. Thus, we have long held that, when it applies, the Clause provides protection against civil as well as criminal actions, and against actions brought by private individuals as well as those initiated by the Executive Branch.
Entirely fair points that give weight to the thesis that Constitutions evolve by their lengthy interpretations over time ( "living documents subject to ammendment and interpretation" )
Bare bones, stand alone, Ye Olde clauses such as this are subject to a breadth of literal interpretation.
What did they "really" mean?
What do we want it to mean?
I count the modern US Supreme Court literalists as deceptives, hell bent on framing original clauses to extract the meaning they want in order to apply them how they wish.
How so? Please elaborate.
I would point out that there's explicit language in Article I, Section 6 about House and Senate members being immune from prosecution for carrying out their duties:
However, there is nothing in Article II regarding a grant of immunity to the President.I could see an argument that the President should probably be protected from arrest during his term, similar to Congressmen, but there's very clearly no mention of such protection in in the Constitution I can find.
However, that's nothing compared to the broad protections the Roberts court handed him in Trump v. United States: protection from investigation, even after his term expires.